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Abstract 
A number of proposals have been put forth regarding the proper way to 
model the societal impact of fatal accidents. Most of these proposals are 
based on some form of utility function asserting that the social cost (or 
disutility) of N lives lost in a single accident is a function of Na. A 
c=:i 
common view is that a single large accident is more serious than many small 
accidents producing the same number of·fatalities, hence a)l. 
c.:::s 
Drawing upon a 
number of empirical studies, we argue that there is insufficient justification 
for using any function of N fatalities to model societal impacts. The 
inadequacy of such models is attributed, in part, to the fact that accidents 
are signals of future trouble. The societal impact of an accident is 
determined to an important degree by what it signifies or portends. An 
accident that causes little direct harm may have immense consequences if it 
increases the judged probability and seriousness of future accidents. We 
propose that models based solely on functions of N be abandoned in favor of 
models that elaborate in detail the significant events and consequences likely 
to result from an accident. 
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Ai.though the world has become safer on the average, it has remained quite 
dangerous at the extreme. Thus as technology has increased life expectancy, 
it has also created the potential for catastrophic losses such as those due to 
dam failures, radiation releases, and airline crashes. Not surprisingly, the 
·I 
control of hazards has become a major concern of society and a growing 
responsibility of government. The need to cope with these risks has led to 
the development of formal analytical methods such as risk assessment and 
decision analysis, designed to assist policy makers in making decisions about 
safety. 
This paper addresses a frequently asked question pertaining to the 
application of formal analysis to safety,decisions: "How should a single 
accident that takes N lives be weighted relative to N accidents, each of which 
takes a single life?" TheJ answer to. this question can have a substantial 
influence on the resources allocated towards preventing accidents of varying 
degrees of severity. Assigning dispropor~ionate weight or seriousness to 
multiple-fatality accidents would tend to prevent such accidents at the cost 
of increasing the risk from smaller accidents. 
Following Keeney [ 11], ~e distinguish the personal impacts of a fatal 
accident (such as the pain, suffering, and economic hardship of the victims 
and their friends and relatives) from its societal impacts (such as the public 
distress and the political, social, and economic turmoil that may result from 
such an accident). Our focus here is on the societal impacts. We begin by 
surveying various proposals from the literature regarding the relative 
weighting of multiple-fatality accidents. The most common view found there is 
that: (a) the soc.ietal impact of the fatalities arising from an accident can 
be modeled adequately as a function of N, the number of lives lost and (b) 
this function should treat a single large accident as more serious than many 
small accidents producing the same total number of fatalities. We shall 
present evidence counter, to this view, arguing that such a model is a doubtful 
basis for social policy. 
Proposals 
Most of the proposals for modeling the impacts of multiple-fatality 
accidents have been based upon some form of utility function asserting that 
the societal cost (or. disutilityf of N lives lost in a single accident is a 
Ct function of If __ ~ We shall refer to this as the _a model. Three general forms 
~ \~ 
of the cw.model have been discussed. As shown in Figure 1, these are 
Ci, 
distinguished by whether t.3'1 (risk neutrality), d:51 (risk aversion), or l::~l 
(risk proneness). 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Many different arguments have been brought forth regarding the proper 
value fore~ Casual observation of society's apparent acceptance of major 
chronic hazards (such as those from motor vehicles), contrasted with its 
seemingly greater concern for potentially catastrophic hazards (e.g., nuclear 
reactors) has led.some to conclude that society is risk averse: 
The public appears to accept more readily a much greater 
social impact from many small accidents than it does from the 
more severe, less frequent occurrences that have a smaller 
societal impact. [20; p.12]. 
Wilson [22] -attempted to quantify the degree of risk aversion, proposing 
that an accident involving N people simultaneously be treated as N2 (not N) 
times as serious as an accident involving one person. ~ore systematic 
observation of accident statistics led Ferreira and Slesin [9] to a similar 
conclusion, namely, "the value of each additional life lost in a single 
accident is greater than the one before" (p. 35). The analysis leading to 
this conclusion was based on the assumption that existence of a consistent 
relationship between severity (N) and frequency of occurrence (f) of deaths 
would reflect, and thus reveal, the workings of a deliberate social attitude 
towards disasters. Plotting data on deaths due to fires, natural hazards, 
mining disasters, and transportation accidents, Ferreira and Slesin observed 
f 
,,3 
that ~) was approximately constant. · This result, they argued, revealed an 
aggregate social consensus that the relative impact of a disaster taking N 
lives is approximately equal to N3. 
CJ 
Griesmeyer, Simpson, and Okrent [91 disputed Ferreira and Slesin's 
methodology and interpretations, pointing out that the steep decline in 
frequency with increase in magnitude need not reflect the controlling 
influence of any social value :=iystem. Griesmeyer et al. noted that the 
observed frequency-magnitude relationship could be due to many other factors, 
such as the cost of .accident prevention and phystcal limitations on ,the number 
of situations that could lead to large consequence events. Further, they 
argued thatC")values of 2 or 3 are clearly inconsistent with the level of risk 
tolerated from many current technologies. For example, many dams or chemical 
·storage facilities located near large population centers pose extremely small 
(but non-zero) probabilities of accidents killing thousands of persons. The 
benefits of such facilities would never be able to outw~igh the expected 
social costs if the potential fatalities were raised to the second or third 
power prior to being weighted by their probabilities of occurrence. oYet such 
facilities exist. 
A more fundamental weakness of analyses like that of Ferreira and Slesin's 
is the assumption that current levels of risk are ·socially acceptable and 
constitute appropriate guides for future decisions. If one doubts these 
assumptions, then little can be concluded from historical risk statistics [7]. 
Although skeptical of Ferreira and Slesin's analysis, Griesmeyer and 
Okrent [8] did not abandon the notion of risk aversion. Arguing that the 
trauma and other secondary impacts of large accidents reduce society's 
resiltence, they recommended incorporating a modest degree of risk aversion in 
safety criteria for nuclear reactors.· To provide an incentive to reduce the 
magnitude and frequency of large accidents, they tentatively proposed using 
,Q=l.2 to evaluate the severity of early deaths due to reactor accidents. 
Other.proposals for reactor safety criteria have also incorporated risk 
aversion [4, 13, 19, 23]. 
Risk aversion is a _popular, but by no means universal, view. Keeney [11, 
12] has presented three assumptions, each of which leads to risk proneness. 
The first assumption asserts that a sure loss of N fatalities is less 
desirable than a 50-50 chance of either 2N f~talities or O fatalities. This 
.( 
assumption has received some empirical support. When people were asked to 
imagine themselves in the role of civil defense officials forced to choose 
between such policies,. fewer than 25% selected the policy leading to the sure 
loss [6]. Keeney's second assumption asserts that as N gets increasingly 
large, each incremental life lost has less marginal societal impact. The 
intuitive justification for this second assumption is Keeney's impression that 
' ..... 
' ' 
"-' 
the societal impacts of, say, 50,000 and 100,000 fatalities would be fairly 
similar. Keeney's third assumption is that people would prefer "risk equity" 
defined as uniform risk of death across individuals. He has shown that risk 
proneness logically follows from such a preference [12]. 
The linear, or risk-neutral, impact function of Figure l also has its 
advocates. As Keeney [11] observed, only this type of function is compatible 
with the desire to minimize the expected number of lives lost. Also, it is 
the function underlying the use of monetary amounts .to value lives lost in 
risk analysis [ 10, 14., 24]. 
Are People Really Risk Averse? 
Our own view, to which we now turn, is that social response to multiple-
fatality accidents does not reflect risk aversion and that the use of the a 
. c::; 
model in risk analysis is inappropriate. As a case in point, we will consider 
the limitations of models with a)l for guiding social policy regarding nuclear 
<:;,; 
For some observers, the clearest evidence that society places dispropor-
tionate emphasis on avoiding multiple-fatality accidents is its treatment of 
nuclear power. There is no question that society reacts strongly to the 
threat of nuclear accidents by requiring reactors to satisfy a great number of 
strict and costly regulations. We believe, however, that this reaction occurs 
because many people see the risks from nuclear reactors as uniquely unknown 
and unbounded. It's not that a)l for nuclear power risks but that the 
. r..:..::;; 
potential N is believed to be very large. 
One source of evidence for this view comes from studies in which various 
groups of laypeople were asked to characterize the risks from nuclear power 
and other risky technologies and activities on various qualitative dimensions 
7 
[15, 16, 17, .21].· The "risk profiles" derived from these ratings showed that 
nuclear power had the distinction of scoring at or near the extreme on a 
number of undesirable characteristics. Its risks were seen as particularly 
involuntary, unknown, uncontrollable, unfamiliar, dread, and fatal. Further 
analysis indicated that these various risk characteristics could be collapsed 
into two more general dimensions or factors, unknown.risk and dread 
(uncontrollable, catastrophic) risk. The unique position of nuclear power, in 
the extreme unknown and dread quadrant of this space, is shown in Figure 2. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Further research has provided addition~! insights into the nature of 
people's perceptions of nuclear risks. In one study [15] people were asked to 
"estimate how many people are likely to die in the U.S. next year (if next 
year is an average year)" as a consequence of each of 30 activities and tech-
nologies. In addition, respondents were asked to give a multiplier indicating 
how many times more deaths would occur if next year were "particularly 
disastrous," rather than average. The results indicated that nuclear power 
I 
was recognized as having relatively few fatalities in an average year. 
However, nuclear power was in a class by itself as far as its perceived 
potential for catastrophic losses of life. The geometric mean of these 
'multipliers was about 100. More than 40% of the respondents had multipliers 
in excess of 1,000. Each respondent's expected number of fatalities from an 
activity in a disastrous year was estimated by applying the disaster 
multiplier to his or her'average-year fatality estimate. When this was done 
for nuclear power, almost 40% of the respondents had estimates greater than 
10,000 fatalities and more than 25% had estimates exceeding 100,000 
8 
' fatalities. Another study [18), in which people were asked to write scenarios 
describing their image of a maximum credible nuclear power disaster, further 
demonstrated the belief that nuclear power can lead to hundreds of thousands, 
even millions, of immediate deaths. Given such images of disaster, there is 
no need to raise the number of expected fatalities to a power greater than 1 
to explain people's strong concerns about nuclear power and their desire to 
see it regulated strictly. 
An Experimental Test of Risk Aversion 
The research cited above suggests that what appears to be a special 
aversion to nuclear reactor accidents may result from people's perceptions of 
these risks as extreme, unbounded, and catastrophic. Because people view 
these risks as unknown and possibly immense, they react strongly to actual and 
potential accidents. 
However, our ability to draw general conclusions from these results is 
limited beca~se nuclear· power risks confound two important characteristics, 
catastrophic potential and imprecision. A clearer understanding of people's 
risk attitudes might be obtained if these two qualities could be unconfounded. 
Would people be averse to multiple-fatality accidents if their risks were 
known with precision? Would the introduction of imprecision into the risk 
estimates lead to greater risk aversion? 
We addressed these questions by designing an experiment in which we asked 
several hundred college students to play the role of a regulator who had to 
choose between two proposed safety rules that expressed different attitudes 
towards risk aversion. Rule A would save lives by preventing individual-
fatality accidents. Rule B would save somewhat fewer lives by reducing the 
probabiblity (or in some cases the magnitude) of multiple-fatality accidents 
9 
(see Table 1). The risks associated with each action were precisely 
described. Thus a'choice indi;cating risk aversion could not be attributed to 
the greater imprecision that usually characterizes catastrophic risks. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------·----
In this study, more than 70% of the respondents selected Rule A, thus 
choosing to minimize average lives lost rather than reduce the risk of a 
catastrophic accident. In order to assess the robustness of this result, we 
tried two variations on this task. In one case, Rule B was said to reduce the 
number of lives lost in a single accident from 300 to 30, leaving the 
probability unchanged at 1/10. In the second, paragraph-length arguments were 
given in support of each rule. Neither variation made a difference in the 
results. Thus, for these precisely defined fatality estimates, we found no 
evidence of risk aversion. 
In order to investigate the effects of uncertainty, we designed a 
variation of the regulatory choice task in which respondents were told: 
One complication ts that even the best technical experts 
expres~ uncertainty about the number of.lives that might be lost 
if a multiple-fatality accident occurs. Although 300 is indeed 
the best estimate, it is possible that many fewer or many more 
lives might be lost. Having considered the rather large range of 
the number of fatalities that might occur, the staff feels 
strongly that 30 fatalities is a realistic average per year for 
multiple-fatality accidents. 
10 
This description was intended to simulate the sort of imprecise knowledge that 
might be found in the assessments of risk from nucl~ar reactors. 
Introduction of imprecision into the risk estimate made our respondents 
somewhat more concerned about reducing the multiple-fatality accident. 
Although the majority still chose to minimize average fatalities by means of 
Rule A, selection of Rule B increased from below 30% to about 43% of the 
respondents. 
The effect of imprecision, although small in this study, further 
suggests that people's strong concerns ~bout reactor accidents are due, not to 
risk aversion, but to their belief that N is large and not precisely bounded. 
I 
Accidents as Signals 
In addition to being skeptical about the appropriateness of modeling 
societal impacts by some risk-averse function of N fatalities, we have doubts 
about the ability of any function of N, risk averse or not, to capture the 
societal importance of fatal accidents. The most dramatic demonstration of 
the inadequacies ?f such models comes from examining the consequences of the 
accident at the Three Mile Island (TM!) nuclear reactor in 1979 [2,3]. Few 
accidents in our history have had such enormous societal impact. As one 
industry source observed. with a mixture of frustration and puzzlement: 
The irrevocable loss of nuclear generating capacity for the 
rest of the century [due to the TMI accident] is already equiva-
lent to 2 million barrels of oil per day during that time., 
regardless of conservation efforts. This represents an addi-
tional fuel bill of as much as $500 billion ••• and• is one measure 
of the price being paid as a consequence of fear arising out of 
an accident that according to the most thorough estimates may 
@ 
not have physiologically hurt even one member of the public. 
[1; P• 30] 
The extreme impact of the TMI accident on the structure and viability of 
the entire nuclear power industry would never have been predicted by thec::._-:i 
model or any other model based solely on number of fatalities. We believe 
that at least one missing ingredient in these simple models is recognition of 
the role that accidents play as signals of future trouble [22]. Thus, the 
social impact of an'accident will be large, regardless of its death toll, if 
the accident greatly increases the estimated risk of the activity or 
technology. The accident at TMI was seen as such an extremely informative and 
ominous signal, raising fears that this technology was not adequately under 
control. As a re·sult, it led to a strong sociopolitical reaction whose 
consequences (stricter regulation of the nuclear industry, reduced operation 
of reactors worldwide, increased costs of reactor construction and operation) 
dwarfed the more direct costs (possible latent cancers, property damage, 
repairs, cleanup, etc.), significant as these were. 
The potential importance of viewing accidents as signals goes beyond the 
domain of nuclear power. The generality of this concept is demonstrated by a 
study in which we asked 21 women (median age= 37) to rate the seriousness of 
10 hypothetical accidents. Several aspects of seriousness were rated, 
including: 
(a) The total amount of suffering and grief caused by the loss of life in 
each mishap; 
(b) the number of people who need to be made aware of the mishap via the 
media; 
(c) the amount of ·effort (and money) that should be put into invest-
igating the cause·of the mishap and preventing its recurrence; and 
(d) the degree to which hearing about the mishap would cause one to be 
worried and upset during the next few days. 
Our respondents also rated the informativeness of these incidents, defined 
as the degree to which the mishap told them (and society) something that may 
not have been known about the hazardousness of the specific activity. 
The accidents were constructed so as to vary with respect to total 
fatalities and informativeness (see Table 2). The five less informative 
accidents represented incidents that were generated by reasonably familiar and 
understood processes. The more informative mishaps were designed to signal a 
change in riskiness, some potential for the proliferation of similar mishaps, 
or some breakdown in the system controllin$ the hazard. For example, a bus 
skidding on ice represent,ed a low-information mishap because its occurrence 
did not signal a change in motor-vehicle risks (except for a limited time at 
that site), whereas an accident caused by a poorly designed steering system in 
a new model automobile would be informative about all such vehicles. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
All ratings were on a seven-point scale. The mean ratings are shown in 
Table 2. Note that the five mishaps designed to be high in signal value were 
all judged more informative than any mishap in the low-information category. 
In general, the amount of suffering and grief attributed to an accident was 
closely related to the number of people killed. All other aspects of 
perceived seriousness were, however, more closely related to the accident's 
information content. Accidents signaling a possible breakdown in safety 
control systems or the possibility that the mishap might proliferate were 
judg~d more worrisome and in need of greater awareness and greater public 
13 
effort to prevent reoccurrences. The number of people killed was not related 
to these aspects of seriousness. 
To gain a more systematic·understanding of the concept of accidents as 
signals, we attempted to determine whether signal potential was related to the 
factor structure of perceived risk shown in Figure 2 •. We selected a set of 30 
hazards, known on the basis of a previous study [17] to be distributed across 
i 
the four quadrants of the factor space. From the high dread, high unknown 
quadrant, we selected hazards such as DNA technology, nuclear reactors, 
orbiting space satel.lites, and radioactive wastes. Highly unknown but not 
dread hazards included microwave ovens, contraceptives, water chlorination, 
and antibiotics. Known and dread hazards included coal mining, nerve gas, 
dams, and connnercial aviation. Known but not dread hazards included 
skateboards, power mowers, tractors, bicycles, automobiles, and recreational 
boating. 
The participants in this study were 78 university students who rated each 
of these 30 hazardous.activities and technologies according to the degree to 
which an accident taking 1 or 2 lives "serves as a warning signal for society, 
providing new information about the. probability that similar or even more 
destructive mishaps may occur within this type of activity.·· The participants 
were also asked to rate the overall seriousness of an accident involving each 
of those hazards (holding fatalities and other damages constant). 
The size of each point in Figure 3 reflects the mean rating of signal 
potential for.each hazard. It is apparent that the judged signal potential of 
a hazard is closely related to location within the two dimensional ~pace. 
Signal potential correlated with the "dread" factor (r=.58), the "unknown" 
factor (r=.71), and their linear combination (r=.92). Signal potential also 
correlated .94 with mean ratings of the overall seriousness of an accident. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
In sum, the signal pot~ntial of an accident is closely related to its 
perceived seriousness and is highly predictable from knowledge of where the 
hazard stands with regard to dread risk, unknown risk, and the component 
characteristics that comprise these general factors (these components are 
shown at the bottom of Figure 2) • 
. Conclusions 
The societal impact of fatal accidents cannot be modeled solely by a 
function of N, the number of fatalities, including the oft-proposed function 
~ Therefore, models based on such functions should not be used to guide 
,V'" ........ } 
decisions about hazardous activities or technologies. 
One reason for the inadequacy of models based solely on the number of 
fatalities is that accidents are signals, providing information about the 
nature and controllability of the risks involved. An accident will have 
relatively little societal impact beyond that of its direct casualties if it 
occurs as a result o( a familiar, well understood process with little 
potential for proliferation or catastrophe. In contrast, an accident that 
causes little direct harm may have immense consequences if it increases the 
judged probability or seriousness of future accidents. 
The concept of accidents as signals helps explain society's strong 
response to some nuclear power mishaps. Because reactor risks are perceived 
as poorly understood and catastrophic, accidents with few direct casualties 
may be seen as omens of disaster, thus producing indirect or "ripple" effects 
resulting in immense costs to industry and society. One implication of signal 
value is that great eff.ort and expense might be warranted to minimize the 
possibility of small.but frightening reactor accidents. 
·The systematic relationship between signal potential, accident serious-
ness, and the characteristics of a hazard (Figure 3) may provide some guidance 
for modeling societal impacts. For familiar hazards, whose risks are seen as 
well understood and neither dread nor catastrophic, accidents may carry little 
new information and their social impact may be determined adequately by the 
direct 1costs of N lives lost. For hazards that are less well understood, more 
dread, or both, accidents will be more potent signals and a simple function of 
N will not be adequate to represent their import. 
Although signal potential may be a useful indicator of the need for more 
complex modeling, it alone is an incomplete model of impact. For example, the 
rupture of a pipe in the steam generator of the Ginna Nuclear Power Plant in 
I 
January 1982 and the subsequent radiation release, had some characteristics of 
the accident at TMI. However, the Ginna mishap was controlled quickly and 
effectively and led to none of the broader societal consequences that followed 
TMI. The physical, managerial, and social contingencies that differentiated 
this accident from the one at TM! need to be discovered and included in models 
4esigned to represent the societal impacts of a reactor mishap. 
In sum, when attempting to model the societal impacts of accidents, we see 
no alternative but to elaborate the various events and consequences that may 
result from such accidents, the consequences of these consequences, the 
probabilities of all these direct and higher order effects, and some measures 
of their costs. Such modeling may appear unmanageably complex. However, we 
believe,that even a rough or crude attempt to anticipate possible higher order 
consequences of an accident is preferable to the use of simpler models with 
known inadequacies. 
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Table Of 19 
.Descriptions of Safety Rules Posing a Choice Between Minimizing 
Fatalities or Reducing the Risk of Multiple-Fatality Accidents 
Summary of Current Situation 
Type of 
accident 
No. of deaths Average frequency of 
per accident accidents per year 
Average No. of 
deaths per year 
Single-fatality 
accidents 
Multiple-fatality 
accidents 
1 
300 
X 
X 
200 
1/10 
= 
= 
Total Average Number of Deaths = 
Summary of Safety Rule A 
Type of No. of deaths Average frequency of Average No. of 
accident per accident accidents per year deaths per year 
Single-fatality 1 ·x 170 = 170 
accidents 
Multiple-fatality 300 X 1/10 = 30 
accidents 
Total Average Number of Deaths = 200 
200 
30 
230 
Average No. 
lives saved 
30 
0 
30 
Safety Rule A is a rule requiring the installation of a different set of new and 
expensive equipment that would reduce the frequency of single-fatality accidents per 
year from its present average of 200 down to a new average of 170. The new equipment 
would not change the likelihood or severity of multiple~fatality accidents. Thus 
Safety Rule A would, on average, save 30 lives per year. 
Type of 
accident 
Single-fatality 
accid.ents 
Multiple-fatality 
accidents 
No. of deaths 
per accident 
i 
300 
Summary of Safety Rule B 
Average frequency of Average No. of 
accidents per year deaths per year 
X 
X 
200 
1/100 = 
Total Average Number of Deaths = 
200 
3 
203 
Average No. 
lives saved 
0 
27 
27 
Safety Rule Bis a rule requiring the installation of new and expensive equipment 
that would reduce the frequency of a mutliple-fatality accident from its present 1-in-
10 chance per year to a 1-in~lOO chance per year. Lt would not affect the number of 
workers dying if the accident occurs. Nor would it in any·way affect the frequency of 
single-fatality accidents. Under Safety Rule B, the average number of lives lost per 
year from a mutlple-fatality accident would go from its present 1/10 x 300 = 30 down to 
1/100 x 300 = 3. Thus Safety Rule A would, on average, save 27 lives per year. 
TABLE 
Effect of Informativeness on the Impact of Catastrophic Mishaps 
Bus skids on ice and runs 
off road (27 killed) ............................. . 
Dam collapse (40 killed) ........................ . 
Two jumbo jets collide 
on runway (600 killed) ........................... . 
Hundred year flood (2,700 killed) ................ . 
Meteorite hits stadium (4,000 killed) 
Nuclear reactor accident: 
Partial core meltdown releases radiation 
inside plant but not to outside ( l killed) .......... . 
Botulism in well-known brand 
of food (2 killed) ............................... . 
. New model auto steering fails (3 killed) .......... . 
Recombinant DNA workers 
Inform-
ativness 
Suffering 
and Grief 
Less Informative Mishaps 
l.8 
4.7 
4.8 
2.8 
2.2 
4.4 
4.9 
6.1 
6.1 
6.2 
More Informative Mishaps 
6.5 
5.7 
5.2 
4.5 
3.7 
3.8 
contract mysterious illness ( iO killed) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 4.6 
Jet engine falls off on takeoff (300 killed) . . . . . . . . . . 5. 7 6.0 
Source: Slavic, Fischhoff. & Lichtenstein '[16F;,r·-·-
.... w_w-· .. - - .. , • -
Need for 
Awareness 
2.5 
4.7 
5.8 
5.3 
5.7 
6.5 
5.2 
5.2 
5.9 
6.1 
Effort to 
Prevent 
Recurrence 
3.1 
5.9 
6.5 
3.5 
2.1 
7.0 
6.1 
6.3 
6.3 
6.9 
Worry 
1.8 
3.8 
4.5 
2.7 
2.5 
6.1 
4.6 
4.6 
5.1 
5.5 
Social 
Cost 
0 1 2 ··· N 
Lives 
Lost 
risk neutrality 
Social 
Cost 
0 1 2 ... N 
Lives 
Lost 
risk aversion 
Social 
Cost 
0 
.---..-
21,_ · 
1 2 ··· N 
Lives 
Lost 
risk proneness 
Figure 1. Three proposals regarding the impact of multiple-fatality ac~idents. 
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Figure 2. Hazard locations on Factors 1 and 2 derived from the inter-
relationships among 18 risk characteristics. Each .factor is made up 
of a combination of characteristics, as indicated by·the lower diagram. 
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Figure 3. Relation between signal potenti~l and risk characterization 
for 30 hazards. Each point represents a hazardous activity. The 
larger the ·size of the point; the greater the degree to which an 
accident involving that haza.rd·was judged to "serve as a warning 
signal for society, providing new information about the probability that 
similar or even more destructive mishaps might occur .:within this type 
of activity." 
